Political streams in Indonesia*
2009-05-06
Traditionally the term aliran (social streams) has been used as a tool to explain political
behaviour in Indonesia. The origins of the term can usually be traced to anthropology and used in
reference to Java.
This term, however, has also been applied historically as a tool to explain electoral politics in
Indonesia. For example it is often stated that the santri (orthodox Muslims) tended to support the
right wing parties (Masjumi and NU) while the abangan (syncretic Muslims) tended to support
the left wing parties (PNI and PKI).
For a long time I have doubted the validity of this aliran approach to explain why certain voters
support particular parties in Indonesia. For example what is the relevance is the concept of santri
and abangan in explaining the electoral behavior of Christian communities in North Sulawesi?
At the same time there can be doubt that there are partisan divisions within Indonesian politics.
The question therefore is to identify just what is the dividing line or lines within the Indonesian
electorate. In essence what is the left and the right in Indonesia?
Since 1999, many international journalists have come to me asking which is the left and the right
wing parties here. The problem is that the concept of left and right in the West is quite different
to Indonesia. There the left is identified as those political forces supportive of a large role for the
Government in the economy while the right wing supports free markets with minimal
Government "intervention ".
I always explain that in Indonesia the general view with regards to economic policy making is
basically pragmatic, not ideological. The key guiding view is what is most effective and at what
time. I would offer the example of economic policy making during the New Order as an ideal
example of this economic pragmatism. Recalling this era had the same leader and a largely
stable inner economic team the following policy lines were followed:
Economic liberalization (late 1960s to the start of the first Oil Boom)
State capital intensive industrialization (during the rest of the 1970s)
Social and rural development (from end of 1970s following student and other protest about low
impact of oil boom on public welfare)
Deregulation with export oriented development (following collapse of oil prices in mid-1980s)
Mixed market intervention in support of favored projects (from the mid 1990s to the end of the
New Order)
It is very clear that under the same leadership there were frequently quite dramatic shifts in
economic philosophy. So if the left-right split in Indonesia is not based upon economic
ideology, what it is?
In short the cleavage here is about the position of Islam within the public domain. The division
of electoral forces along a left-right axis in Indonesia contains three broad groupings.
On the left end we find those who are very sensitive to any attempt at insinuating a special role
for Islam within the legal or constitutional structures or to providing for differentiation of
citizenship on the basis of a Muslim − non-Muslim divide. Examples of parties in this stream
include PDIP and PDS.
On the right end we find those who believe that Islam must constitute an indivisible part of the
soul and spirit of the nation. Examples of parties in this stream include PPP, PKS, PBB and
PBR.
During the early years of the Republic this political division was simply unbridgeable. At the
time the nation was polarized between these two competing visions of the nation. Indeed the
failure to conclude a permanent constitution during the 1950s could in no small way be traced
back to this division.
Nevertheless in the modern era, it seems that Indonesia has also managed to develop a "middle"
vision between these two traditional visions. I would refer to the ideological position of people
in this middle position as promoting a state of Godliness. These middle ground people would
view Islam as a source of thinking to inform public policy, but Islam is not to be the basis or only
determining factor. In addition all other religions and communities have an equally valid input.
Examples of parties in this middle ground include Golkar, PKB, Demokrat and PAN.
PKB and PAN are often seen as Islamic parties, perhaps because these two parties maintain
special links to mass based Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Nevertheless I think it is
incorrect to locate them with the right wing block. For example in the MPR debates about the
Jakarta Charter (which would compel Muslims to follow Sharia), both these parties rejected this
proposal, while the right block (PPP and PBB) were active supporters.
Furthermore within both parties reaching to senior positions there are many non-Muslim party
activists including those who become legislators.
Recently there emerged a political discussion on the merits of having a presidential candidate
with solid Islamist credentials. While the right block parties like PPP and PKS and several other
Islamist activists spoke favorably to the proposal, both PKB and PAN rejected the concept
arguing that as all likely candidates were Muslim, why make an issue of this.
If we wish to identify the dividing line within a society it is necessary to seek out a "lightning
rod" issue in which clear and passionately held positions emerge. In Indonesia during the past
few years the most controversial piece of legislation was the anti-pornography law. During this
debate the political divisions among the parties of the left and right came into very sharp relief
with the middle ultimately closing the gap.
In this debate the two left parties (PDIP and PDS) both actually rejected the whole law − an
extraordinary break with the tradition of full consensus on legislative products. At the same time
the parties to the right were proposing support for anti-pornography and anti-pornoaction from
the original draft of the bill.
The role of the middle ground parties in this debate was to soften the edges of several elements
of the draft so it was less extreme than in the original format.
Before this law, constitutional debates in the MPR saw the lightning rod issue being the Jakarta
Charter in which the left remain totally opposed while the right were in support.
Once again the middle ground parties played the role of bridge between these two groups. For
example while each of the middle ground parties rejected the Jakarta Charter, they remained
open to negotiate just what would be an acceptable compromise to ensure that all sides would
continue to work within the established constitutional system.
The role of this middle ground as a bridge provides a substantive basis for political stability in
Indonesia. The basis for this stability is actually further accentuated when we consider that a
clear majority of voters support parties in this middle block. This was radically different to the
1950s when support between the left and right was a little over 40% of the electorate each, with
no substantive party in the middle.
Accepting the reality that the majority of the electorate now accepts this broad "state of
Godliness" vision, it is not at all surprising to find that the parties of the left and the right seek to
appeal to these middle block voters. For example to demonstrate it is open to more Islamist
voters, PDIP has established an Islamic network while from the right PKS conducts promotional
party activities in predominantly Hindu Bali to demonstrate it is open to all communities of the
nation. These initiatives are very rational although not without some risk. For example straying
too far from home base could easily cause a party to lose its true believers to another competitor
party seeking support from the same part of the electorate. The result however is that there is a
strong pulling to the centre of politics, and not a dangerous polarization as still seen too often in
other Muslim majority societies.
In this regard I would argue that the level of substantive political stability in Indonesia is today
greater than at any time in its history. The main potential source of political instability today is to
be found with battles among egos at the elite level should some of them refuse to accept the
verdict of the electorate through elections. Control of spoiler type behaviour will come through
voter rejection of support for such candidates and their political parties in subsequent electoral
contests. In this regard the final verdict on the fate of spoiler ego behaviour rests with the
collective wisdom of the Indonesian voters.
* This Article was originally published in the Tempo English Edition of 31 March − 6 April
2009. I thank Tempo and its Executive Editor, Ibu Yuli Ismartono, for permission to re-print it
here. The article was also published in the Indonesian version of Tempo of the same week.
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